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Abstract. Electronic cash (E-cash) is the digital counterpart of cash payment. They allow
users to spend anonymously unless they “double spend” their electronic coins. However, it
is not possible to prevent users from misbehaving under some other subjective definitions
of misbehavior, such as money laundering. One solution is to incorporate a trusted third
party (TTP), which, upon complaint, uses its power to deanonymize the suspected user.
This solution, known as fair e-cash, is not fully satisfactory since additional measure has to
be taken to stop misbehaving users from further abusing the system after they have been
identified. We present a e-cash system with anonymous user suspension, EC-AUS, which
features an suspension manager (SM) that is capable of suspending the underlying user
that participates in any suspicious transaction. Suspended users cannot participate in any
transaction. The suspension is anonymous in the sense that no party, not even SM, can
tell the identities of the suspended users nor link their past transactions. If they are found
innocent later, their suspension can be revoked easily.
1 Introduction
E-cash was introduced by David Chaum [18] as an electronic counterpart of physical money.
Extensive research [19, 28, 24, 20, 7, 17, 23, 14] has been done on the subject since then. In an e-
cash scheme, a user withdraws an electronic coin from the bank and the user can spend it to any
merchant, who will deposit the coin back to the bank.
A secure and practical e-cash should possess three essential properties, namely, anonymity,
balance and exculpability. Anonymity (also referred to as privacy), is a distinctive feature of cash
payments offers a customer. It means that payments do not leak the customers’ whereabouts,
spending patterns or personal preferences. Balance means that no collusion of users and merchants
together can deposit more than they withdraw without being detected. Finally, exculpability refers
to the fact that honest spenders cannot be accused to have double-spent.
Too much privacy may cause problems in the regulatory levels since there is no way misbehaving
users can be identified, let alone being punished. Spending the same electronic coin twice, also
known as double-spending, is a prominent example of misbehavior. Existing e-cash schemes tackle
this dilemma by incorporating mechanisms such that spending an electronic coin twice provides
sufficient information for everyone to compute the user’s identity.
Unfortunately, misbehavior cannot always be represented by mathematical relationships such
as spending the same electronic coin twice. For instance, it is hard to define mathematically
transactions for money laundering, illegal goods purchasing and blackmailing. Fair e-cash [15]
addresses the issue by introducing an administrative party, called Open Authority (OA), which is
capable of outputting the identity of a user participating in a transaction. This solution, however,
does not stop the user from further abusing the system. The user can still spend all his other
electronic coins after his identity is revealed. This gives the opportunity for the misbehaving
user to transfer his money to some other accounts. In order to stop this, OA will have to open
identities of all the transactions to check the flow of the money. The problem can be tackled using
the technique of traceable signatures [27] in which the administrative party discloses some secret
information, also known as tracing information, of a particular user, which, enables everyone
to test if a spending belongs to that specific user. This property is sometimes known as coin
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traceability [10]. The problem is, once the tracing information is disclosed, there is no way to
restore the user’s privacy even if he/she is found innocent later.
We think it is important to equip e-cash systems with anonymous user suspension in which
users can be suspended without sacrificing their privacy. Suspended users are simply stopped from
accessing the system, while their identities remain hidden. Law-enforcing agent can thus suspend
users that participate in dubious transactions, investigate the case, and un-suspend the suspect if
he/she is found innocent.
Our Contributions. We propose an electronic cash with anonymous user suspension (EC-AUS). We
formalize the security model for such a system and prove that our construction is secure under
this model. Furthermore, we also evaluate the performance of our system.
Paper Outline. In Section 2, we present preliminary information on the various cryptographic
tools used in our construction. In Section 3, we formalize the syntax and security properties for
EC-AUS. We present our construction and analyze the algorithmic complexity in Section 4. We
discuss extensions and several other issues in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
Related Work. Our EC-AUS is constructed based on the blacklisting technique from black-
listable anonymous authentication systems [29, 8]. Their idea can be summarized as follow. For
each authentication, a user with secret key x provides the server with a unique value, called ticket
t, which is bx in some cyclic group G for a random nonce b. The server provides the user with a
blacklist {(t1, b1), (t2, b2), . . . , (tn, bn)}. In order to authenticate, the user proves to the server, in
zero-knowledge, that ti 6= bxi for i = 1 to n and t = bx. This assures the server that the authen-
ticating user is not on the blacklist. If the server would like to blacklist this user later, the entry
(t, b) is appended to the blacklist. If the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem is hard in G,
the ticket t is unlinkable and thus user anonymity is preserved.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we define some notations and review cryptographic tools that we use as building
blocks in our EC-AUS construction.
Notations. |S| represents the cardinality of a set S. If S is a non-empty set, a ∈R S means that
a is drawn uniformly at random from S. If n is a positive integer, we write [n] to mean the set
{1, 2, . . . , n}. If s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}∗, then s1||s2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the concatenation of binary strings s1 and
s2. We say that a function negl(λ) is a negligible function [3], if for all polynomials f(λ), for all
sufficiently large λ, negl(λ) < 1/f(λ).
Bilinear Map. A pairing is a bilinear mapping from a pair of group elements to a group element.
Specifically, let G1,G2 be cyclic groups of prime order p. A function ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 is said to
be a pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
– (Bilinearity.) ê(ux, vy) = ê(u, v)xy for all u, v ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zp.
– (Non-Degeneracy.) ê(g, g) 6= 1G2 , the identity element of G2.
– (Efficient Computability.) ê(u, v) is efficiently computable for all u, v.
– (Unique Representation.) All elements in G1, G2 have unique binary representation.
Proof of Knowledge. In a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK) protocol [25], a prover
convinces a verifier that some statement is true, while the verifier learns nothing except the validity
of the statement. Σ-protocols are a special type of three-move ZKPoK protocols, which can be
converted into non-interactive Signature Proof of Knowledge (SPK) schemes or simply signature
schemes [26] that are secure in the Random Oracle (RO) Model [4]. Σ-protocols can be transformed
to 4-move perfect zero-knowledge ZKPoK protocols [21]. They can also be transformed to 3-move
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concurrent zero-knowledge protocol in the auxiliary string model using trapdoor commitment
schemes [22].
We follow the notation introduced in [13]. For instance, PK{(x) : y = gx} denotes a Σ-
protocol that proves the knowledge of x ∈ Zp such that y = gx for some y ∈ G. The values inside
the parenthesis on the left of the colon denotes variables whose knowledge is to be proven, while
values on the right of the colon except those inside the parenthesis denote publicly known value. We
use SPK{(x) : y = gx}(M) to denote the transformation of the above Σ-protocol into signature of
knowledge, which is secure in the random oracle model due to Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We employ
several existing Σ-protocols as building blocks in our construction of EC-AUS. In particular, the
ZKPoK of Knowledge and Inequalities of Discrete Logarithms due to Camenisch and Shoup [12].
BBS+ Signature. We briefly review the signature scheme proposed in [1], which is based on the
schemes of [11] and [6]. This signature scheme also serves as building blocks in a number of
cryptographic systems [2, 29, 9] and is referred to as BBS+ signature or credential signature.
Let g0, g1, g2, . . ., g`, g`+1 ∈ G1 be generators of G1. Let ê be a bilinear map as discussed.
Let w = gγ0 for some γ ∈R Zp. The public key of the signature scheme is (g0, . . . , g`, w, ê), and the
signing key is (γ).
A signature on messages (m1, . . . ,m`) is a tuple (A, e, z), where e, z are random values in Zp
chosen by the signer such that A = (g0g
m1
1 · · · g`m`gz`+1)
1
γ+e . Such a signature can be verified by
checking if
ê(A,wge0)
?
= ê(g0g
m1
1 · · · g`m`gz`+1, g0).
It was proved in [1] that BBS+ is unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attack if the
q-SDH assumption holds, where q is the number of signature queries, and that they also proposed
a ZKPoK protocol which allows one to prove possession of message-signature pairs.
3 Security Definition
We present the syntax of EC-AUS, followed by the security properties that any EC-AUS construc-
tion must satisfy.
3.1 Syntax
The entities in EC-AUS are the Suspension Manager (SM), Bank (B), a set of Merchants (M) and
a set of users (U). EC-AUS consists of the following protocols/algorithms:
– (bpk, bsk)← BSetup(1λ). This algorithm is executed by the bank B to set up the system. On
input of one or more security parameters (say, 1λ), the algorithm outputs a pair consisting of
public key bpk and private key bsk. B keeps bsk private and publishes bpk to the public. bpk
is an implicit input to all the algorithms described below.
– (pk, sk) ← KeyGen. This algorithm is executed by the user or merchant to generate her key
pairs. We assume there exists some kind of public key infrastructure that ensures the public
key pk is properly certified and is a unique identifier for the user or merchant.
– {SUL← SSetup}. SM maintains a suspended user list SUL which is available to all entities in
the system and is empty initially.
– AccEstablish(B(bsk, pkU),U(pkU, skU)). This protocol is executed between B and a legitimate
user U with public key pkU to establish an account. Upon successful completion of the protocol,
the user obtains an account secret cred, which she keeps private to herself, and is thereby
eligible for conducting transactions in the system.
– Withdraw(B(bsk,SUL, pkU),U(cred,SUL, skU)). This protocol is executed between B and a
legitimate user U to withdraw an electronic coin. Upon successful completion of the protocol,
the user obtains an electronic coin cn, which she keeps private to herself.
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– Spend(M(pkM, skM,SUL),U(cred, pkM, cn,SUL)). This protocol is executed between a mer-
chant M with public key pkM and a legitimate user U to spend an electronic coin. Upon
successful completion of the protocol, M accepts the coin and obtains a transcript trans.
– Deposit(B(bsk, pkM),M(trans, skM)). This protocol is executed between B and a merchant M
for the later to deposit an electronic coin. Upon successful completion of the protocol, B either
accepts the request or outputs pk∗, along with trans1, trans2, Π which serves as a proof
that the party with public key pk∗ has spent an electronic coin twice in transactions with
transcripts trans1, trans2.
– 0/1 ← VerGuilt(trans1, trans2, pk∗, Π). Everyone can execute this algorithm to check if the
party with public key pk∗ indeed spent an electronic coin twice in transactions whose tran-
scripts are trans1 and trans2.
– Suspension. This is a suite of three algorithms: $ ← Extract(trans), SUL ← Add(SUL′, $)
and SUL′ ← Remove(SUL, $). These algorithms are executed by SM to suspend or un-suspend
a user. On input of a Spend protocol transcript trans, Extract extracts and returns a ticket $
from the transcript. The suspended user list SUL is a collection of tickets. On input of a SUL
and a ticket, Add returns a new SUL that contains all the tickets in the input SUL’ in addition
to the input ticket. On the other hand, on input of SUL′ and a ticket, Remove returns a new
SUL that contains all the tickets in it, except the one(s) equivalent to the input ticket.
When we say that a user Alice is suspended, we mean that there exists a Spend transac-
tion between Alice and a merchant M with transcript trans such that the SM has invoked
Add(SUL,Extract(trans)) and no Remove(·, Extract(trans)) has been invoked afterwards. If
Alice is suspended, she cannot conduct Withdraw or Spend. We would like to stress that
SM learns nothing about the identity of Alice, nor link any of Alice’s past action. All SM does
is to suspended an anonymous user that has participated in a spend that results in transcript
trans.
3.2 Security Requirements
We first describe various security properties that an EC-AUS construction must possess. Their
formal definitions will be given in Appendix A.
– Balance. The bank B is assured that no collusion of users and merchants can deposit more
than they withdraw without being identified. Consequently, any double spender in the system
will be identified.
– Suspension-Correctness. B is assured to accept Withdraw, while Ms are assured to accept Spend,
only from Us who are not suspended. On the other hand, honest users that are not currently
suspended by SM can always conduct the above transaction with honest B or Ms.
– Anonymity. All that B, M and SM collude together can infer about the identity of a spender
is whether that user is suspended at the time of protocol execution, and whether she is in
possession of a valid electronic coin.
– Exculpability. An honest user will not be falsely accused of having spent an electronic coin
twice. That is, B cannot output (trans1, trans2, pk
∗, Π) such that 1 ← VerGuilt(trans1,
trans2, pk
∗, Π) even if B colludes with M and SM.
The trust placed on various parties regarding the security requirements are summarized in
Table 1. The table is interpreted as follows. If Party A is to be assured Security Requirement B,
he/she needs to trust the party with tick mark. For instance, users, bank and merchants need to
trust that SM is honest for suspension-correctness to hold. Indeed, that is the only trust placed
in our system. For instance, an honest user is guaranteed anonymity and exculpability even if the
bank, merchant, suspension manager are malicious.
4 Our System
4.1 High Level Description
We provide a high level description of EC-AUS, which combines the technique of the e-cash scheme
due to [2, 10] and the anonymous blacklisting technique from [29].
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Table 1. Trust Relationship of various parties.
Party A Security Requirements B Bank Suspension Manager Merchant User
Bank Balance N/A × × ×
User/Bank/Merchant Suspension-Correctness × X × ×
User Anonymity × × × ×
User Exculpability × × × ×
The Setup. Let G be a cyclic group and g, h, h0, h1 are generators of G. User and Merchant are
equipped with key pairs of the form (gx, x) where g is a generator of G. The bank chooses
a signature scheme and assume the key pair is (pkSig, skSig). The public key of the bank is
pkSig. The secret key is skSig. The suspension manager makes available an empty list, SUL.
Account Creation. User U with public key gx creates an account with the bank B by submitting
a value hx to the bank, along with a proof-of-correctness.
Withdrawing an E-Coin. U first needs to show B he/she is not suspended. Both parties first
obtain the current SUL = {(t1, b1), (t2, b2), . . ., (tn, bn)} from suspension manager SM.
U proves to B that using his secret key x, none of the relationships ti = b
x
i hold. B only issues
U with an electronic coin if U is not suspended. An electronic coin for U is simply a signature
σx,y from B on values (x, y), where y is a random number unknown to B. σx,y is issued in a
“blind” way such that B learns nothing about x and y.
Spending an E-Coin. U needs to prove to M that he/she is not suspended before M would accept
payment from U. Both parties first obtain the current SUL = {(t1, b1), (t2, b2), . . ., (tn, bn)}
from suspension manager SM. U and M agree on a unique transaction identifier R and a
random value b. U then computes S = h0
y, T = hxhRy1 and t = b
x and proves the following
facts.
1. U knows σx,y which is a valid signature from B on values x, y.
2. S, T , t are formed correctly with respective to x and y.
3. ti 6= bxi for i = 1 to n.
Depositing an E-Coin. M submits (S, T , t, R) to B, along with the transcript trans of the spend
operation. After checking the transcript, B checks if S is in its database. If yes, it is a coin
that has been spent before. If not, it stores (S, T , t) in its database and credits M.
Dealing with Double-Spending. If B (S, T ′, t′, R′) is in its database, The public key of the double-
spender can be computed as (T
R′
TR
)
1
R′−R . Indeed, due to the soundness of the proof in the spend
protocol, T = hxhRy1 and T
′ = hxhR
′y
1 . Thus (
TR
′
TR
)
1
R′−R = ((hx)R
′−R)
1
R′−R = hx = u.
Suspension. To suspend a user, SM appends the value (b, t), in the protocol transcript of a spend
operation, to SUL. Note that SM does not know the identity of the user being suspended; he
just suspend the user that engage in this transaction. To un-suspend the user, SM removes
that entry from SUL.
4.2 Construction Details
We now present our cryptographic construction of EC-AUS.
Parameters. Let λ be a sufficiently large security parameter. Let (G1,G2) be a bilinear group
pair such that |G1| = |G2| = p for some prime p of λ bits. Also, let G be a group of order p
where DDH Assumption holds. Let g, g0, g1, g2, g3 ∈ G1, h, h0, h1 ∈ G be generators of G1 and
G respectively such that the relative discrete logarithm of the generators are unknown.1 Let
H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp be secure cryptographic hash functions, both of which
will be modeled as random oracles.
BSetup, SSetup, KeyGen. The bank B randomly chooses γ ∈R Zp and computes w = gγ0 . The
bank secret key is bsk = (γ) and the public key is bpk = (w).
1 This can be done by setting the generators to be the output of a cryptographic hash function of some
publicly known seeds. It is important for the users to verify this. For instance, knowledge of the discrete
logarithm of h1 to base h0 would allow the bank to break the anonymity of the system.
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The user U (resp. merchant M) randomly chooses x ∈R Zp and computes u = hx. The secret
key is sk = (x) and the public key is pk = (u).
The suspension manager SM initializes the suspended user list SUL.
AccEstablish. User U sends her public key pkU = (u) to B, along with the following the zero-
knowledge proof-of-knowledge PK{(x) : u = hx} to open an account in the bank. U stores the
account secret cred = (x).
Withdraw.
1. U and B retrieve the current SUL from SM and parse SUL as {(t1, b1), . . ., (tn, bn)}.
2. U initializes the request, claims to be the user with public key u who has already registered
an account.
3. B sends a random challenge m ∈R Zp to U.
4. U sends a pair (C,Π1) to B, where C = g
x
1g
y
2g
z′
3 ∈ G1 is a commitment of x, y ∈R Zp using
randomness z′ and Π1 is a signature proof of knowledge of
SPK 1
(x, y, z′) : C = gx1gy2gz′3 ∧ u = hx
 ∧
i∈[n]
ti 6= bxi
 (m) (1)
on challenge m, which proves that C is correctly formed.
5. The B returns failure if the verification of Π1 returns invalid. Otherwise B sends U a
tuple (A, e, z′′), where e, z′′ ∈R Zp and A = (g0Cgz
′′
3 )
1
e+γ ∈ G1.
6. U computes z = z′ + z′′. She returns failure if ê(A,wge0) 6= ê(g0gx1g
y
2g
z
3 , g0). Otherwise
she stores cn = (A, e, x, y, z) as her electronic coin.
Note that (A, e, z) is a BBS+ signature on values (x, y).
Spend. During an execution of this protocol between a user U and the merchant M, U’s private
input is her electronic coin cn = (A, e, x, y, z). Let R be the string that uniquely identifies
this transaction. In particular, R includes the public key pkM of M, the version of SUL used
and a random nonce nonce. When the protocol terminates, M outputs success or failure,
indicating whether the payment is accepted. Both parties retrieve the current SUL from SM
and parse SUL as {(t1, b1), . . ., (tn, bn)}.
1. (Challenge.) M sends a random challenge m ∈R Zpto U.
2. (Suspension Check.) U returns failure if ti = b
x
i for some i (indicating that she is sus-
pended). She proceeds otherwise.
3. (Proof Generation.) U returns to M a tuple (S, T, t,Π2), where S = h
y
0, T = uh
yR
1 , t = b
x
where b = H0(R). S is called the serial number of the coin while T is called a double-
spending equation. The pair (S, T ) allows the bank to identify the double spender. t is the
ticket associated with the transaction which allows suspension. Finally, Π2 is a signature
proof of knowledge of:
SPK 2
(A, e, x, y, z) :
ê(A,wge0) = ê(g0g
x
1g
y
2g
z
3 , g0) ∧
S = hy0 ∧ T = hx(hR1 )y ∧
t = bx ∧
(∧
i∈[n] ti 6= bxi
)
 (m) (2)
on the challenge m.
4. (Proof Verification.) M returns failure if the verification of Π2 returns invalid. Other-
wise it returns success.
Deposit. The merchant M submits the tuple (S, T, t, R,Π2) to B. B first verifies if R contains a
fresh nonce nonce, the public key pkM of M and obtains version of SUL used in this transac-
tion. B then verifies Π2. It runs through its database of spent coin, which is a list of tuples
(Si, Ti, ti, Ri, Π2,i). If S is not equal to any of the Si, B credits M and appends (S, T, t, R,Π2)
to the list.
If R contains a reused nonce nonce, B outputs pkM.
Otherwise, suppose there exists an entry (Sj , Tj , tj , Rj , Π2,j) for some index j in the list such
that S = Sj , B computes u
∗ = (T
Rj
TRj
)
1
Rj−R and outputs pk∗ = u∗, trans1 = (Sj , Tj , tj , Rj , Π2,j),
trans2 = (S, T, t, R,Π2) and Π = (trans1, trans2), indicating that u
∗ is the public key of
the double spender.
Electronic Cash with Anonymous User Suspension 7
VerGuilt. Since the computation of the identity of the double spender does not require bsk, every-
one can verify the correctness of the bank’s computation based on the two given transcripts.
Suspension. The three algorithms Extract, Add, Remove are all very simple and efficient. Extract
(
〈S, T, t, R,Π2〉
)
returns the ticket
(
t, b = H0(R)
)
in the input transcript. Of course, SM should also verify Π2
to ensure that the transcript is valid. Add
(
SUL, (t, b)
)
returns SUL′, which is the same as the
input SUL, with the input ticket (t, b) appended to it. Remove(SUL, (t, b)) returns SUL′, which
is the same as the input SUL, with all entries equal to the input ticket (t, b) dropped.
Formal security analysis of our construction is presented in Appendix A.
4.3 Efficiency Analysis
We analyze the efficiency of our construction in terms of both time and space/ communication
complexities. Both complexities are linear in the size of SULfor Withdraw and Spend protocols.
Below we analyze the most expensive operation, Spend, in our system.
Assume SUL contains n tickets. A proof Π2 of SPK 2 consists of 2 G1 elements, n G elements
and 2n+ 10 Zp elements. The total communication complexity for a Spend protocol is thus n+ 1
`-bit strings, 5 G1 elements, n G elements and 2n+ 10 Zp elements.
A breakdown of time complexity of the Spend protocol into the number of pairing operations
and multi-exponentiations (multi-EXPs)2 in various groups is shown in Table 2. Operations such
as G addition and hashing have been omitted as computing them takes relatively insignificant
time. Some preprocessing is possible at the user’s side. In fact, all but 2n multi-EXPs in G can be
precomputed by the user.
Table 2. Number of operations during a Spend protocol with a SUL of size n.
Operation User w/o Preproc. User w/ Preproc. Merchant
G1 multi-EXP 6 0 3
G multi-EXP 3n+ 6 2n 2n+ 3
Pairing 1 0 1
5 Discussions
5.1 Incorporating Tracing Authority and Open Authority
Introduction of Open Authority (OA). It is relatively straightforward to introduce an Open Au-
thority (OA) which is capable of revealing the public key of the user of any Spend transaction.
One could simply require all users to verifiably encrypt [12] their public key gx into ciphtertext
Cx under the public key of the OA in the Spend transaction. This allows the OA to decrypt Cx
and obtains the public key of the user participating in the Spend transaction.
Introduction of Tracing Authority (TA). We can also introduce TA in EC-AUS based on the idea
of traceable signature [27]. Each user is issued a traceable signature signing key kx,trace from TA
such that kx,trace is bind to the user public key g
x. All users are required to create a traceable
signature σx using his key kx,trace in the Spend transaction. If the TA would like to trace the
spending of a particular user, he/she reveal the tracing information of kx,trace so that every one
can link the traceable signature σx from user with key kx,trace and thus link all his past actions.
2 A multi-EXP computes the product of exponentiations faster than performing the exponentiations
separately. We assume that one multi-EXP operation multiplies up to 3 exponentiations.
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Three levels of anonymity revocation. The trio of TA, OA and SM provide a balance between
users’ privacy and accountability. For instance, when a suspicious transaction is identified, the
law-enforcing agent can at once request a suspension from SM on the underlying user. Since SM
reveals least information on the user, the threshold of issue could be fairy low. After preliminary
investigations, law-enforcing agent could request TA to release the tracing information so that all
transaction regarding the suspect can be linked and provide more information for the law-enforcing
agent to make further investigation. Finally, he/she could request OA to reveal the identity of the
spender for prosecution.
5.2 Managing the Size of SUL and the Bank’s Database
Our system does not scale well with the size of the SUL. Thus, we assume that suspended users
are eventually un-suspended if they are found innocent or their identity are revealed by the OA
for prosecution. This would help keeping the size of SUL a minimum. Using practical parameters,
modern computer handles a multi-EXP at around 2 ms. Realistically, EC-AUS would support SUL
of size up to several thousands.
Another issue is the requirement that the bank has to keep record of all the electronic coins
deposited. One solution is to limit the lifetime of the user account as well as the coins. Users are
required to establish a new account and have their electronic coins re-issued at the end of the
period. The account and coins are made valid only for a specific period of time, say, a month,
several months or a year which offers a trade-off between database size and the frequency of the
re-issue. Thus, the bank only needs to record spent coins of the current time period.
6 Conclusion
We presented EC-AUS, an electronic cash system with anonymous user suspension. Since suspended
users remain anonymous, misbehavior can be judged subjectively and imposed with less cation.
We also discuss how to limit the size of the bank’s storage. We believe the ability to suspend users
while maintaining their anonymity is a worthwhile endeavor. We left it as an open problem of
constructing schemes whose complexities is independent to the size of SUL.
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A Formal Security Analysis
A.1 Security Model
We use a simulation-based approach to define security of EC-AUS formally. We would like to
remark that the definition we give do not entail all formalities necessary to fit into the universal
composability framework [16]; our goal here is to prove security of our construction. Our model
is static in the sense that the adversary could not corrupt honest users and merchants during the
execution of the system.
We summarize the ideas of the model. The players in the system are the suspension manager
SM, the bank B, a set of users Us and a set of merchants Ms. In the real world there are a number of
players who communicate via cryptographic protocols. Then there is an adversary A, who controls
the dishonest players in the system. We define an entity called environment, E , who provides the
inputs to the players and receives their outputs. E also interacts freely with the adversary A.
In the ideal world, we have the same players. However, they do not communicate directly.
Rather, there exists a trusted party T who is responsible for all handling operations for all play-
ers. Specifically, T computes the outputs of the players from their inputs, that is, applies the
functionality that the cryptographic protocols are supposed to realize. The environment E again
provides the inputs to, and receives the outputs from, the players, and interacts arbitrarily with
A who controls the dishonest players.
10 Man Ho Au, Willy Susilo, and Yi Mu
The ideal world. First we define the ideal world specification of EC-AUS. Communication be-
tween a player and the trusted party T is not anonymous. Ideal world EC-AUS supports the
following operations. These operations are scheduled according to the environment E ’s wish. Each
call to the operation is assigned a unique identifier tid. We also describe the behavior of T based
on the inputs of the ideal world players for the following operations. The SUL in the ideal world
is a list of tid of Spend operation.
• tid0 ← SSetup/BSetup/KeyGen(HP,AP). The system begin when E invokes this operation
which specified the set of honest players HP and dishonest players AP. This must be the first
operation in the schedule and can only be called once.
• tidA ← AccEstablish(i). E instructs user Ui to establish an account with bank B. Ui sends a
request to T , T checks Ui has never established an account before and informs B that Ui would
like to establish an account. B returns accept/reject to T and T forward it to Ui. Both Ui
and B output (tidA, accept/reject) to E individually.
• tidW ← Withdraw(i). E instructs user Ui to withdraw an electronic coin from B. Ui sends a
request to T , T requests the current version of SUL from SM and forward SUL to Ui, along
with a check result that indicate if Ui is suspended or not. Ui replies to T if he/she chooses to
proceed or not. T requests the same version of SUL from SM, check if Ui has ever participated
in the Spend specified in this SUL and forwards SUL to B, a bit indicating if Ui is suspended
and the request that Ui would like to withdraw an electronic coin. B returns accept/reject to
T and T forwards it to Ui. If B returns accept, T stores tidW as Ui’s un-spent coin. Both Ui
and B output (tidW , accept/reject) to E individually.
• tidS ← Spend(i, tidW , j). E instructs user Ui to spend the electronic coin he/she obtains in
transaction tidW to merchant Mj . Ui sends a request to T , T requests the current version of
SUL from SM and forward SUL to Ui, along with a check result that indicate if Ui is suspended
or not as well as whether tidW corresponds to an un-spent coin of Ui. Ui replies to T if
he/she chooses to proceed or not. T requests the same version of SUL from SM, check if Ui
is suspended and forwards SUL to Mj , the request that an anonymous user that would like
to spend a coin to Mj , and whether this user is suspended or not and whether Ui is having a
valid coin (valid means tidW corresponds to a Withdraw that Ui participated in, it might be
a spent-coin though). Mj returns accept/reject to T and T forwards it to Ui. If Mj returns
accept, T marked tidW as Ui’s spent coin. Both Ui and Mj output (tidS , accept/reject)
to E individually.
• tidD ← Deposit(j, tidS). E instructs user Mj to deposit the electronic coin he/she obtains
in transaction tidS . Mj sends a request to T , T requests the version of SUL used during
Spend of tidS from SM and forward SUL to B, along with a check result that indicate if tidS
corresponds to a Spendi, tidW , j that results in Mj outputting accept and that Ui is not
suspended based on SUL. Next T also informs B if tidW corresponds to a deposited-coin. If
yes, T gives B an identity, Ui or Mj , indicating if the coin is spent twice by Ui or deposited
twice by Mj . If not, T marks tidW as a deposited coin from Mj . Both B and Mj output
(tidD, accept/reject(Ui/Mj)) to E individually.
• tidV ← VerGuilt(P, tidD,Ui/Mj). E instructs any player P to query if B outputs a correct
double-spender in transaction tidD. T replies with a bit, indicating if the correct double-
spender is outputted in tidD.
• tidSus ← Suspend(tid§). E instructs SM to add the Spend identified by tidS to SUL.
• tidUn−Sus ← Un− Suspend(tid§). E instructs SM to removes the entry tidS from SUL.
Ideal world EC-AUS provides all the desired security properties. Firstly, all Spend transaction
are anonymous. T only informs and M a certain anonymous user would like to spend an e-coin.
Thus, anonymity and exculpability is guaranteed. Secondly, T verifies if validity of the user during
Withdraw, Spend and Depositand thus balance is assured. Finally, T consults SM for SUL and
checks if the underlying user is suspended for the B and M and thus suspension-correctness is
attained.
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Next, we define a cryptographic EC-AUS which also supports the above eight types of trans-
action. Since there is no trusted party T , the functionalities are realized through cryptographic
means. Below we highlight the difference.
• tid0 ← SSetup/BSetup/KeyGen(HP,AP). SM, B, Us and Ms invokes the respective algorithms
SSetup, BSetup and KeyGen.
• tidA ← AccEstablish(i). Ui and B obtains the current version of SUL from SM individually
and engage in the AccEstablish protocol.
• tidW ← Withdraw(i).Ui and B obtains the current version of SUL from SM individually and
engage in the Withdraw protocol.
• tidS ← Spend(i, tidW , j). Ui and M obtains the current version of SUL from SM individually
and engage in the Spend protocol.
• tidD ← Deposit(j, tidS). Mj and B engage in the Deposit protocol in which B obtains from
SM the version of SUL used in the Spend protocol identified by tidS .
• tidV ← VerGuilt(P, tidD,Ui/Mj). P interacts with B who proves to P the identity of the
double-spender is correctly computted.
Informally speaking, a cryptographic system is secure if for every real world adversary A and
every environment E , there exists an ideal world adversary S controlling the same players in the
ideal world as A does in the real world such that, E cannot tell whether it is running in the real
world interacting with A or it is running in the ideal world interacting with S which has blackbox
access to A. The rationale is that since by default the ideal world EC-AUS is secure, and the real
world EC-AUS is indistinguishable to the ideal world EC-AUS, the real world EC-AUS is also secure.
Formally, we define it in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Security). Let RealE,A(λ) (resp. IdealE,SA(λ) ) be the probability that E outputs
1 when run in the real world (resp. ideal world) with adversary A (resp. S having blackbox access
to A). A EC-AUS construction is secure if
|RealE,A(λ)− IdealE,SA(λ)| = negl(λ)
for every PPT algorithms E, A.
A.2 Security Analysis
The security of our EC-AUS construction depends on the following two assumptions:
Definition 2 (DDH). The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in group G is defined as
follows: On input of a quadruple (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4, output 1 if c = ab and 0 otherwise. We say that
the DDH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm has non-negligible
advantage over random guessing in solving the DDH problem.
Definition 3 (q-SDH). The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem in G is defined as follows:
On input of a (q + 1)-tuple (g, gx, gx
2
, . . ., gx
q
) ∈ G, output a pair (A, e) ∈ G × Zp such that
A(x+e) = g where |G| = p. We say that the q-SDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has
non-negligible advantage in solving the q-SDH problem.
The q-SDH assumption was introduced by Boneh and Boyen [5] when they proposed a new
short signature. They derived a lower bound on any generic algorithm that solves the q-SDH
problem.
Regarding the security of EC-AUS, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the q-SDH assumption holds in G1 and the DDH assumption holds in G, our
construction of EC-AUS satisfies Definition 1 in the random oracle model.
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Proof of Theorem 1 is done by showing the indistinguishability between adversary actions in
the real world and the ideal world. The idea of the proof is that, given a real world adversary
A, we show how to construct an ideal world adversary SA3 such that no environment E can
distinguish whether it is interacting with A or S. The proof is divided into three cases according
to the subset of players controlled by A. In the first case, A controls the SM, a subset of merchants
and users. This covers the security requirement of balance. In the second case, A controls SM,
the bank, a subset of merchants and users. This covers the security requirement of exculpability
and anonymity. In the third case, A control a subset of merchants and users. This covers the
security requirement of suspension-correctness. We would like to remark that the three cases are
orthogonal because on one hand, S has to represent all honest players to A, while on the other
hand S has to represent all dishonest players to E . Thus, an adversary A controlling fewer parties
does not necessarily makes the construction of S easier. We complete the proof with the following
three lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any environment E and real world adversaries A controlling the SM, some subsets
of merchants and users, there exists an ideal world simulator SA such that
|RealE,A(λ)− IdealE,SA(λ)| = negl(λ)
Proof. (Sketch) We construct S as follow. On one hand, S represents the honest merchants Ms,
users Us and the bank B to A while on the other hand, S represents the dishonest Us, Ms and SM
to T as well as E based on the actions from A. S forwards all the messages between between E
and A. Next, for all AccEstablish involving a dishonest user, S, playing the role of B, extracts the
secret x from A and uses x as an index for the underlying dishonest user. It then represents that
dishonest user to T and initiates an AccEstablish request. For all Withdraw involving a dishonest
user, S extracts the values (x, y, z′) from Eq.1. For all Spend events involving a dishonest user, S,
playing the role of an honest merchant, runs through its list of (x, y, z) extracted and locate the
user by testing if S = hy0 and t = b
x and locate the tid of the corresponding Withdraw event in
the ideal world. It then represents that dishonest user to T and initiates a Spend request.
S’s behavior in the view of E is exactly the same as A would provide, except in the case when S
cannot extract the values from A, or the extracted values do not matches with previously extracted
one. This represents A is able to break the soundness of the various zero-knowledge proves, which
happens with negligible probability under the q-SDH Assumption.
Lemma 2. For any environment E and any real world adversaries A controlling SM, the bank,
some subsets of merchants and users, there exists an ideal world simulator SA such that
|RealE,A(λ)− IdealE,SA(λ)| = negl(λ)
Proof. (Sketch) Construction of such S is straightforward. S forwards all the messages between
E and A. For all events when S has to represent an honest user, S employs the zero-knowledge
simulator to simulate the proofs using a random and different (x, y). S’s behavior in the view
of E is exactly the same as A would provide, except in the case when A is able to break the
zero-knowledgeness. This happens with negligible probability under the DDH Assumption.
Lemma 3. For any environment E and any real world adversaries A controlling some subsets of
merchants and users, there exists an ideal world simulator SA such that
|RealE,A(λ)− IdealE,SA(λ)| = negl(λ)
Proof. (Sketch) Construction of such S is straightforward. Again, S forwards all the messages
between E and A. For all events when S has to deal with dishonest user, S extracts the user secret
x from the zero-knowledge proofs. S’s behavior in the view of E is exactly the same as A would
provide, except in the case when S cannot extract the values from A, or the extracted values do
not matches with previously extracted one. This represents A is able to break the soundness of
the various zero-knowledge proves, which happens with negligible probability under the q-SDH
Assumption.
3 The subscript A is used to emphasis that S is given blackbox access to A.
